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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
APPRECIATED PROPERTY TRANSFERS UNDER THE
ILLINOIS MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION
OF MARRIAGE ACT
Under prior Illinois law, the common law principles of ownership
by title,' alimony 2 and fault 3 governed the adjudication of property
rights in divorce proceedings. Property was distributed in accordance
with the manner in which title to the property was held by the di-
vorcing parties. The wife was entitled only to alimony 4 and had no
rights in any property held by the husband unless she could prove an
equitable interest in that property 5 or unless compelling circum-
stances mandated that the property be transferred to her as a form
of alimony in gross. 6 Absent these equitable or compelling
circumstances the court had no authority to allocate any separate
property to the non-title holding spouse. 7 Moreover, the trial court
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 18, 19 (1975).
2. Id. § 18. Alimony means the "sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced hus-
band and stems from the common law right of the wife to support by her husband." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 97 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1975).
4. Id. § 19.
5. Id. § 18. This section provides:
Whenever a divorce is granted, if it shall appear to the court that either party holds
title to property equitably belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance
thereof to be made to the party entitled to the same, upon such terms as it shall
deem equitable.
6. Id. § 19. Section 19, paragraph one provides:
When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such order touching the alimony
and maintenance of the wife or husband, the care, custody and support of the chil-
dren, or .any of them as, from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case, shall be fit, reasonable and just and, in all cases, including default cases, the
court shall make inquiry with respect to children of the parties, if any, and shall
make such order touching the care, custody, support and education of the minor
children of the parties or any of them, as shall be deemed proper and for the
benefit of the children. The court may order the husband or wife, as the case may
be, to pay to the other party such sum of money, or convey to the party such real
or personal property, payable or to be conveyed . . . in gross or by installments as
settlements in lieu of alimony, as the court deems equitable. [emphasis added].
"Alimony in gross," defined as alimony in a lump sum, is in the nature of a property settlement.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 97 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
7. See Debrey v. Debrey, 132 I11. App.2d 1072, 270 N.E.2d 43 (1971). In the absence of
statutory authority to compel the transfer of property the court cannot rely on any general
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considered fault 8 on the part of the defendant as a factor in its cal-
culation of alimony. Such considerations often resulted in dispropor-
tionate alimony settlements so flagrant as to be characterized as
"blackmail, intimidation and coercion." 9
In response to these and similar problems, 10 the Illinois General
Assembly recently passed the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act," a bill which significantly reforms Illinois' domestic
relations law.' 2  The Act has specifically eliminated the consideration
power of equity. 132 Ill. App.2d at 1074. 270 N.E.2d at 44. The equitable interest that one
spouse has in the title holding spouse was not established by the marital relationship alone.
Under Section 18 the spouse must show a contribution such as money or services which en-
hanced the value of the property. Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill.2d 342, 347, 185 N.E.2d 201, 205
(1962).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1975). The statute listed causes such as impotence, deser-
tion, habitual drunkenness, and conviction of a felony.
9. M. Auerbach, Overview of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, in
NEW DIVORCE LAW 1-6 (I11. Inst. for CLE, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Overview]. For example,
if the spouse holding title to property, usually the husband, was shown to be personally 'at fault'
he was essentially coerced by court decree into a larger property settlement without proof of a
"special equity" in his property. If the non-title holding spouse, usually the wife, was shown to
be at fault, she was penalized by receiving less alimony or property than she actually needed for
support.
10. The general intent of the Act is to preserve the integrity of marriage, safeguard family
relations and eliminate abuse and acrimony from the divorce proceedings. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, § 102(1) to (6) (1977).
In response to the drastic increase in divorce and the mounting public dissatisfaction with
the abuses of divorce procedures, the Illinois Legislature, on numerous occasions, proposed
various no-fault divorce bills. All were defeated. The Illinois Legislature is philosophically op-
posed to facilitating divorces. The General Assembly, as a matter of public policy, has deter-
mined that the preservtion of the integrity of marriage outweighs the choice of easier dissolu-
tions of marriage. This Act was conceived as "a breaking mechanism to discourage hastily con-
ceived dissolutions of marriage." Overview, supra note 9, at 1-12.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 101 (1977). The bill was introduced on April 7, 1977 by
Senators Cuidice, lynes, Carroll, Daley, Chew, Clewis, Joyce, Class, Weaver, Mitchler,
Rupp, D'Arco, Buzbee, Rock, Newhouse, and Shapiro. It passed the House with a vote of 97 to
52 on June 23, 1977, and the Senate on May 19, 1977 with a vote of 45 to 3. The Act became
effective on October 1, 1977 and applied to all pending actions with respect to issues on which a
judgment had not been entered as of the effective date. Id. § 801(b).
12. The most significant acts repealed by Section 901 on October 1, 1977 were:
(a) "An Act to revise the law in relation to marriages," approved February 27, 1874,
as amended. (ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 89, §§ 1-17(a)).
(b) "An Act to establish the validity of marriages contracted, wherein one or both of
the parties were slaves at the time, and to establish the legitimacy of their offspring
as to the right to inherit property," approved May 15, 1891. (ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
89, § 8).
(c) The "Uniform Marriage Evasion Act," approved June 25, 1915, as amended.
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, §§ 19-24).
(d) "An Act to revise the law in relation to divorce," approved March 10, 1874, as
amended. (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1-21.4).
(e) "An Act in relation to married men and women," approved May 17, 1877, as
amended (ILL. REx'. STAT. ch. 68 §§ 22-33).
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of marital fault in the adjudication of property rights incident to the
legal dissolution of marriage.' 3 In so doing, the legislature con-
templated that a "faultless" property distribution would reduce the
economic coercion which often accompanies interspousal negotiations
in a divorce proceeding. In addition, the legislature intended to treat
these property distributions in a manner similar to the dissolution of a
commercial partnership where neither partner is penalized for exces-
ses of personal conduct. 14
This reformulation of the principles underlying property distribu-
tion represents the Act's most significant departure from previous
domestic relations law. To accomplish this reformulation the Act has
created a new res in Illinois called "marital property," which, for
purposes of the Act, is defined as "all property acquired by either
spouse subsequent to the marriage ... "15 excepting certain non-
marital property.' 6 Marital property is to be divided in "just propor-
tions" 17 considering all relevant factors including each spouse's re-
spective contribution. '8
(f) Section 8 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife," ap-
proved March 30, 1874. (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8).
(g) "An Act authorizing counties to employ and provide qualified administrative aids
to the circuit courts in said counties in the administration of divorce and separate
maintenance proceedings," approved July 15, 1955, as amended. (ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40 §§ 30-32).
The Act retained an "Act to Revise the law in relationship to husband and wife" approved
March 30, 1874 (and known as the Husband and Wife Act), with the exception of paragraph 8
which was expressly repealed.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 102(6) and 503(c) (1977).
14. Overview, supra note 9, at 1-8. See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT,
(ULA), Vol. 9. (Master ed., 1973), Commissioner's Prefatory Note at 457 which states:
The Act's elimination of fault notions extends to its treatment of maintenance and
property division. The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage
should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to
the dissolution of a partnership. The Act authorizes the division upon dissolution, of
the property acquired by either spouse during the marriage .. . as the primary
means of providing for the future financial needs of the spouses ....
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (1977).
16. Certain property acquired subsequent to the marriage is defined as non-marital prop-
erty:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in
exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
Id. § 503(a)(1)-(6).
17. Id. § 503(c).
18. The statute lists certain factors to be considered by the court for the distribution of
marital property in dissolution of marriage proceedings. These factors include:
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As a result of this mandatory distribution of marital property, cer-
tain federal income tax questions inevitably arise concerning the
realization of any taxable gain to either party. Since the Act is com-
pletely silent on the tax consequences of the property distribution
provisions, this Note will examine the law concerning divisions of
marital property, compare the Illinois statute with similar statutes in
other jurisdictions and suggest that the most reasonable interpretation
in light decisions in those jurisdictions is the "species of com-
mon ownership" criterion under which the gain on all transfers re-
flecting the transferee's contribution would be nontaxable.
UNITED STATES V. DAVIS: A FEDERAL CRITERION?
Prior to the seminal United States v. Davis 19 decision, the issue of
whether any gain was realized pursuant to an appreciated property
distribution received conflicting treatment. In earlier cases 20 the
Board of Tax Appeals held that the appreciation of property trans-
ferred to a spouse pursuant to a divorce settlement could not be
taxed as a capital gain to the transferor for two fundamental reasons.
First, and most importantly, there was no objective standard to value
the marital rights received by the husband in exchange for his ap-
preciated property. Second, even if such an amount were ascertain-
able, the transaction was held to be a nontaxable division of property,
on the ground that to hold that "a man has realized taxable income by
(1) the. contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or
depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property, in-
cluding the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of prop-
erty is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home,
or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having custody of
the children;
(5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party;
(6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets
and income.
Id. § 503(c)(1)-(10).
19. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
20. Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941); Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A.
933 (1940).
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giving up a substantial portion of his property seems . . .unreason-
able and not justified either under general law or under the revenue
act." 21
The Board was reversed by both the Second and Third Circuits 22
which rejected the Board's arguments concerning the indeterminabil-
ity of the gain by applying the rule of equivalence. Under this valua-
tion concept it is presumed that the appreciation of property could be
measured by assuming the relinquished marital rights to be equal in
value to the transferred property.2 3 Both Circuits also rejected the
Board's characterization of the transfer as a division of property and
instead viewed the transaction as a required purchase of marital rights
imposed upon the husband by the divorce decree. The husband's ob-
ligation to support his wife was satisfied by the transfer and therefore
was to be considered a "sale" and taxed as such. 24
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in United States
v. Davis 25 by characterizing the transfer of appreciated property
upon divorce as a taxable event. In Davis, the taxpayer husband
transferred 500 shares of appreciated stock 26 to the wife "in full set-
tlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the
husband whatsoever .... "27 including, under Delaware law, the
right of intestate succession, 28 dower,2 9 and a share of the husband's
property upon divorce. 30
21. 42 B.T.A. at 941.
22. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741
(1943); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942).
23. The court in Mesta concluded that "[t]he fair market value of the property or benefit
received by [the husband] for the stock may be difficult to ascertain, but in the absence of any
other value being shown ... it is proper to take the fair market value." 123 F.2d at 988.
24. I.R.C. § 1001(a). The Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960), added to the conflict by adopting the position
held by the Board of Tax Appeals. The court ruled that even though a property transfer might
be a taxable event, the gain realized was indeterminable because of the impossibility of cal-
culating the fair market value of the wife's marital rights. Section 1001(b) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code requires that capital gains be measured by the fair market value of propety re-
ceived by the taxpayer, not by the fair market value of the transferred property. Fair market
value is the price at which property would be exchanged by a willing buyer and seller. The
court, in Marshman, held that a divorce proceeding did not conform to a fair market exchange.
"A single transaction between a husband and wife made under the emotion, tension and practi-
cal necessities involved in a divorce proceeding does not comply with this rule." 279 F.2d at 32.
25. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
26. The cost of the appreciated stock to the husband was $74,775.37. The fair market value
at the time of transfer was $82,250.00. The issue to be decided was whether the husband
realized a $7,474.63 taxable gain on the transfer. Id. at 67.
27. Id. at 66-67 (1962).
28. DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 512 (1953 & Supp. 1974).
29. DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 502 (1974).
30. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1531 (1953) (current version DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1527 (1974)).
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In contrast to the previous Court of Appeals decisions, 3' the argu-
ments presented to the Supreme Court focused primarily upon the
nature of the property transfer and not upon the lack of objective
valuation for the gain. 3 2 The Commissioner contended that the
transfer was taxable 3 3 to the husband at the time of transfer because
the property was given in exchange for the release of the indepen-
dent legal obligations of alimony and support.3 4 The taxpayer re-
sponded by first asserting that the transfer was a nontaxable division
of property between co-owners, comparing the wife's interest in the
stock to that of a wife in a community property jurisdiction.3 5 In
evaluating the argument that the spouses should be considered co-
owners, the Court referred to Delaware law for a proper characteriza-
tion of the wife's interests3 6 in her husband's property both before
and after the transfer.
Under Delaware law the wife had no active or passive interest in
the management or disposition of her husband's property during the
marriage. Upon dissolution of marriage she shared in the property
only to the extent that the trial court deemed "reasonable." What
constituted a reasonable share was determined by reference to the
31. See notes 22 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
32. The Court disposed of the valuation issue by rejecting the Marshman presumption that
the rights received could not be objectively valued as equal to the property transferred. See
note 24 and accompanying text supra. The Court adopted the rule of equivalence conceding
that a divorce proceeding was not the best example of an arms length transaction. Nevertheless,
the rule of equivalence was "more consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing
statutes to make a rough approximation of the gain realized .... The taxable gain realized in
such transactions would be as though the parties were dealing at arms length. 370 U.S. at 72.
Despite the Court's adoption of the rule of equivalence, certain language in the opinion argu-
ably leaves open the possibility that a lesser gain will be realized if the transferor can show the
rights received to be clearly less than the fair market value of the property transferred. The
Court stated: "It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's length and that
they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the property for which they were ex-
changed. There was no evidence to the contrary here. ... that the rights and property were
not equal in value. Id. However, this interpretation is of yet unsubstantiated since in no case
has a taxpayer successfully challenged the rule of equivalance on these grounds. SANDER &
GUTMAN, TAX ASPECTS OF DIVORCE AND SEPARATION A-33, (1975).
33. The Court stated the issue in these terms: "[s]hould the economic gain be presently
assessed against the taxpayer, or should this assessment await a subsequent transfer of the prop-
erty by the wife." 370 U.S. at 68. This issue was raised by the ABA Committee on Domestic
Relations Tax Problems, which in 1966, proposed that the gain or loss upon transfer of property
in satisfaction of marital rights not be realized. Instead, the recipient spouse should assume the
transferor's tax basis in the transferring property. This would assure and protect the revenue by
making certain that the gain would not escape taxation altogether. The Davis Court rejected the
postponement alternative and instead imposed the tax on the transferor. See Report of the
Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, 19 ABA Taxation Section 62, 63-65 (1966).
34. 370 U.S. at 69.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 70-71.
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wife's financial condition, her needs in relation to her accustomed
station in life, her age and health, the number of children and their
ages, and the earning capacity of the husband. Moreover, the wife's
intestate rights in her husband's property were dependent upon her
surviving the husband. 37
The Court found the aggregation of these incidents of ownership to
reflect "inchoate" 38 rights in the property, not even remotely reaching
the "dignity of co-ownership." 39 These inchoate interests were held
to resemble the marital rights of support and alimony, and likewise
were found to impose upon the husband a personal liability, rather
than to create a property interest in the wife.40
The taxpayer then contended that to draw a distinction between a
wife's interest in her husband's property in a common law jurisdiction
such as Delaware and a wife's interest in a typical community prop-
erty jurisdiction would be "a double sin." 41 Not only would such a
differentiation depend upon "elusive and subtle casuistries which ...
possess no relevance for tax purposes" 42. but it would also create a
disparity between common law and community property jurisdictions
that would conflict with Congressional policy of equality of tax treat-
ment.4 3 In response, the Court conceded that its characterization of
the transfer would permit differing tax treatments between common
law and community property states. However, since Congress had
not seen to alleviate this disparity in this particular area, the Court
was prepared to let the disparity stand."4
MARITAL PROPERTY IN ILLINOIS:
REJECTION OF THE FEDERAL CRITERION
Davis has been interpreted as establishing all transfers of ap-
preciated property in common law jurisdictions as taxable in the ab-
37. Id. at 70.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Court did not reject the taxpayer's position as totally without merit. For that
matter, the Court granted that it would not be completely illogical to consider "the shearing off
of the wife's rights in her husband's property as a division of that property .... " The Court
seemed to think, on balance, that the Commissioner's position was more reasonable. 370 U.S.
at 71. Some commentators have characterized this analysis as a balancing test, weighing the
wife's ownership rights against her marital rights. See Comment, Federal Income Tax Treatment
of Gains and Losses in Divorce and Separation Property Settlements, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 181,
184 (1975). In any event the Court was inclined to leave open the possibility that a property
transfer could be considered a nontaxable event.
41. 370 U.S. at 69.
42. 370 U.S. at 69-70, quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940).
43. 370 U.S. at 70.
44. Id. at 71. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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sence of three particular indicia of ownership: a right to a descendible
share, a right to manage and dispose, and a right to more than a "just
and reasonable" share. 45 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has
adopted this position on numerous occasions. 4 Indeed the Supreme
Court in Davis indicated that it would not be bound by state "label or
tags" 47 in its interpretation of federal tax law. In a decision involving
federal estate taxes, the Court indicated that where state trial court
actions or legislative characterizations involving ownership rights im-
pinge upon federal tax law, the federal court must independently
examine those ownership rights relevant to the federal tax ques-
tion. 48 A federal court will be bound only by decisions of the state's
highest court involving only state law issues.4 9 All other state court
decisions are merely to be given "proper regard." 50
Since the Illinois Supreme Court, in Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,51
has characterized the wife's rights in marital property, an indepen-
dent federal interpretation of the rights would be neither needed nor
justified. It is clear that the Act's provisions do not apply in the
event of death, 52 nor during the duration of marriage. 53 During the
45. 370 U.S. at 70. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation, 44
Miss. L.J. 740, 755 (1973); Note, Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the
Amiable Fictions of State Law, 52 DENVER L.J. 799, 824-26 (1975). But see Comment, Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Gains and Losses in Divorce and Separation Property Settlements, 20
ST. Louis U.L.J. 181, 189 (1975).
46. See Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Commissioner,
412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969). The Commissioner in Imel argued that characterization of a
transfer as taxable depends on whether the transaction was a division of property by co-owners
or was a sale or exchange resulting in a capital gain under I.R.C. § 1001(c), and Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, ch. 1, § 1002 (repealed by Pub. L. 94-455) 523 F.2d at 855. See also Swaim v. Com-
missioner, 50 T.C. 302 (1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969), in which the Tax Court
regarded Davis as providing the criteria for determining ownership and taxability.
47. 370 U.S. at 70.
48. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The Supreme Court mandated
that the Tax Court should not accept a state trial court's determination concerning the eligibility
of a trust for federal estate tax purposes. The Court held that where federal estate tax liability
depends upon a characterization of a property interest under state law the Federal courts must
make an independent examination of those property interests and apply what they consider to
be appropriate state law. Id. at 465. Even though Bosch involved federal estate tax litigation it
has been held to apply to federal income tax litigation as well. Dodge v. United States, 413
F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1969); Henley v. United States, 396 F.2d 956 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Henry W.
Dodge, Jr., 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1170 (1968).
49. Id. at 465.
50. Id.
51. 71 Ill.2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) restricts the concept of marital property to the Act.
The rules of descent and distribution are specified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1 (1975).
53. Section 503(c) mandates the court to divide marital property only "in a proceeding for
dissolution of marriage . . . , or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution
of marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked
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marriage the wife is unable to manage and control any marital prop-
erty held in her husband's name. 54  She has no alienable interest and
her right to an intestate share will be contingent upon survival.
55
She has no dower or statutory dower right in realty acquired during
coverture. 56 Her share in the marital property is vested only upon
dissolution of marriage and recognized to the extent the trial court
deems just."5 7  This "inventory" of rights would seem not to reflect
the indicia specified in Davis and accordingly would not reach the
required "dignity of co-ownership" which would justify nontaxability.
However, the nontaxability interpretation cannot be substantiated
either by a thorough analysis of the Davis decision itself or by sub-
sequent litigation. 58 The Davis Court itself acknowledged that a
property settlement pursuant to a divorce may constitute a division of
marital property as opposed to a taxable exchange. "Although admit-
tedly such a view may permit different tax treatment among the sev-
eral states, this Court in the past has not ignored the differing effects
jurisdiction to dispose of the property .... " In any event the rights of the non-title holding
spouse vest only upon the dissolution of the marriage. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that:
Operation of the term "marital property" under the Act is not triggered until the
time of dissolution. . . Marital property is defined "only for the purpose of division
on dissolution of marriage or legal separation. No attempt is made to regulate the
respective interests of the spouses in property during the existence of the marriage.
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill.2d 563, 572-73, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (1978).
54. The Illinois Supreme Court also has stated:
The Act does not purport to affect property interests during the marriage. The term
"marital property" is a nomenclature devised to realize an equitable distribution of
property upon termination of the marriage. . . . Section 503(b) does not prevent
married persons from owning property separately during the marriage and disposing
of it in any fashion that the property-owning spouse may choose.
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill.2d 563, 573, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1978).
Plaintiff had contended that the Act would impair pre-existing contractual relationships. How-
ever, the court rejected such an interpretation, reiterating that the section
merely classifies the aggregate property interests of the spouses for the purposes of
equitably distributing the property. That which is classified as "marital property" is
subject to distribution within those limitations set by transfers, assignments and
conveyances of such property. . . Section 503(b) does not require that each "mari-
tal property" interest be divided between the spouses or transferred in whole or in
part to the nonowning spouse. We must presume that the "marital property" will
be distributed pursuant to section 503(b) so as to avoid the impairment of any con-
tractual obligations owed to third parties who are not parties to the dissolution
proceeding.
Id. at 574, 376 N.E.2d at 1387.
55. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-1 (1975).
56. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-9 (1975). The wife has no inchoate dower rights in Illinois.
57. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (1977). See note 53 supra.
58. See notes 74-105 and accompanying text infra.
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on the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences between
community property and common law systems." 59  This statement
seems particularly ironic since, in fact, the substantive differences be-
tween common law and community property systems at the time
Davis was decided were few. 60
In community property states, as well as common law states, the
wife could not manage or dispose of marital property during the mar-
riage 6 1 nor make contracts binding on the community property. 62
The husband's only restriction on management and control in com-
munity property states was a requirement that he obtain a joinder
signature 'from the wife consenting to the conveyance of community
realty. 63 Moreover, little difference existed between community
property and common law jurisdictions in recognizing the wife's right
to a reasonable share of the community property upon divorce. In six
of the eight community property states, a wife's share in the com-
munity property was subject to the same "just and reasonable" limita-
tion as was present in Davis 64 and is present in Illinois under the
current Act. 65 Of the three indicia mentioned in Davis, the only
meaningful distinction between common law and community property
is found in descendibility of interest. In seven of the eight community
property states, the wife could either devise one-half of the commu-
nity assets 66 or let that one-half interest descend according to the local
59. 370 U.S. at 71.
60. Since 1967, seven community property states have amended their statutes to allow for
equal management and disposition rights in the community property. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-
214 (1976); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1977);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 9 5.22 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030
(Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. 9 57-4A-1 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (Supp.
1975). Only one state still considers the husband as the sole manager of the community prop-
erty. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971).
61. Aasz. REV. STAT. § 25-211 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5114, 5115, 5125, 5127 (West
1970); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (1963); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 123.230 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-3 (1962); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4619 (Vernon 1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1961).
62. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-214 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE 9
32-912 (1963); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (1967);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-2 (1962); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4521 (Vernon 1960); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1961).
63. Arizona, California, Idaho, New Mexico and Washington imposed joinder; Louisiana,
Nevada and Texas did not.
64. See notes 116 & 117 and accompanying text infra.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (1977).
66. ARz. REV. STAT. § 14-2101 (Supp. 1976); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21.201 (West 1956);
IDAHO CODE 1 15-2-501 (Supp. 1977); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1470, 1493 (West 1952); NEV.
REV. STAT. 1 133.030 (1973); TEX. PROa. CODE ANN. § 57 (Vernon Supp. 1976); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 1 11.12.010 (Supp. 1975).
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laws of intestacy.6 7 No such right is recognized in Illinois or any
other common law jurisdiction. 68  If these rights were subject to an
evaluation under the "federal criteria" used in Davis, the interest of a
wife in a community property jurisdiction might conceivably be
characterized as lacking co-ownership. Such a view would be in-
accurate since the wife is unquestionably a co-owner in community
property. 69
In summary, a comparison of the community property and common
law jurisdictions indicates th'at the sole use of the three indi-
cia to determine co-ownership is not wholly justifiable. Regardless of
the interpretation that Davis established the indicia of nontaxability,
it is questionable that Davis, in fact, relied solely on these factors.
The Court did not impose these indicia upon Delaware law. Instead,
state law was, by necessity, consulted to determine whether there
were substantive incidents of ownership in the transferee spouse.
This does not exclude the possibility of other indicia of co-ownership
in a common law jurisdiction such as Illinois. In fact, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found none of the Davis indicia in subsequent decisions 70 which
characterized the wife's interests in marital property as a "species of
common ownership"71 akin to co-ownership. Under such a charac-
terization the transfer of property was considered nontaxable.
THE SPECIES OF COMMON OVNERSHIP CRITERION
Because Davis indicated that co-ownership of marital property, ex-
emplified by the rights of transferee spouses in community property
jurisdictions, was necessary for a nontaxable division of marital prop-
erty, 72 taxpayers in common law jurisdictions naturally sought to
analogize their interests in marital property to those within commu-
nity property jurisdictions and thereby avoid the Davis results. 73
67. Local property laws will dictate a presumption of either joint tenancy or tenancy in
common with her husband. If the interest is characterized to be joint, as in California, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, or Washington, then the failure to devise will result in the husband
taking her one-half interest as surviving joint tenant. If the interest is one akin to tenancy in
common then the issue or descendants receive the half.
68. In Illinois the transferee spouses' rights in marital property do not apply in the event of
death. See note 52 supra.
69. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Poe holds that lack of power to manage, control or
dispose of the community property is not dispositive of her vested one-half interest in that
property. 282 U.S. at 111-13.
70. See notes 74-105 and accompanying text infra.
71. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 446 P.2d 290, 295 (Okla. 1968). See text accompany-
ing notes 80-90 infra.
72. 370 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1962).
73. This line of argument was first developed in the Tenth Circuit in Swanson v. Wiseman,
61-1 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) 9264 (W.D. Okla. 1961), where a federal district court held, with
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Perhaps the most successful example of characterizing common law
property as including attributes of community property involved a
controversial 74 series of cases termed the "Collins cases." 75  These
negligible analysis, that a distribution of appreciated stock to a wife pursuant to an Oklahoma
divorce decree was part of a nontaxable division of property between co-owners. The court held
that Oklahoma common law recognizes three classifications of property involving the husband
and wife: (i) the husband's separate property, (ii) the wife's separate property and (iii) any prop-
erty jointly acquired during the marriage. Presumably, the third category was a form of owner-
ship sufficient to be described as co-ownership. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278
(1960).
74. See, e.g., Gunn, The Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform
Divorce Act, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 227; Lawson, Tax Implications of Using Appreciated Prop-
erty in a Property Settlement, 42 J. TAXATION 58 (1975); Note, New Approach to the Transfer
of Appreciated Property Pursuant to Divorce, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 616 (1976); Note, Federal
Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of State Law, 52 DEN. L. J.
799 (1975); Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Property Settlements in Com-
mon Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Proposal, 29 MAINE L.
REV. 73 (1977); Comment, Transfer of Appreciated Property Pursuant to Divorce: Taxable
Event in Oregon? 53 ORE. L. REV. 544 (1974); Comment, Property Transfers in Tennessee
Pursuant to Divorce or Separation: Possible Tax-Free Consequences 41 TENN. L. REV. 339
(1974); Note, Should Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce Depend on State Property
Law?, 49 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (1976); Comment, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Gains
and Losses in Divorce and Separation Property Settlements, 20 ST. Louis U. L. J. 181 (1975).
75. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968),
vacated and remanded per curiam, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd on remand, 412 F.2d 211 (10th
Cir. 1969); Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
In Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Collins I], the
court concluded that the wife had no vested property rights in the jointly acquired property
prior to the divorce decree. The court reasoned that upon divorce the wife received only a
discretionary "just and reasonable" share which was based on factors unrelated to her contribu-
tion in the property. Id. at 354. These factors included the spouse's needs, her station in life, and
the cost of educating the children. The court considered those factors although it recognized
ample Oklahoma precedent to the contrary, holding "that in dividing the jointly acquired prop-
erty the court is not to take into consideration the need of the parties but solely the manner in
which the property was acquired and the actions of both parties in accumulating an estate and
retaining an estate." [emphasis added]. Id. at 356. See, e.g., West v. West, 268 P.2d 250 (Okla.
1954); Hill v. Hill, 197 Okla. 697, 174 P.2d 232 (1946); Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okla. 12, 213 P. 884
(1923); Thompson v. Thompson, 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037 (1918). The Collins I court also
noted that the Tobin case clearly set out the factors to be considered by a court in making the
division of property. A court must "take into consideration the efforts of the respective parties
during their married lives .... If it should develop . . . that the accumulations have been due
to [the wife's] economy, industry, frugality and sturdy virtues, which have been a stay to the
home and the constant guard of the accumulations and at the same time it should develop that
the husband has not been frugal, . . . it would not be equitable to the wife, under these cir-
cumstances, that the husband should be given half of their property." Collins I at 356 n.6.
Moreover, the court held the presence or absence of the Davis factors to conclusively distin-
guish a marital division in satisfaction of a legal obligation from a divison between co-owners.
Accordingly, the transfer was held to be taxable. Id. at 357-58.
Undaunted, the taxpayer, in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968)
[Collins II], brought a state tax refund action in the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Oklahoma
court found the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Oklahoma's divorce law to be incorrect, hold-
ing that the wife possessed the rights of a co-owner under state law. Id. at 295.
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cases involved a transfer of appreciated property under the Oklahoma
divorce statute 76 which required the court to make a "just and
reasonable" 77. division between the parties of any jointly acquired
property, 78 a requirement nearly identical to Illinois law under the
new Act. 79
The taxpayer contended that both he and his former wife held a
vested interest in their jointly acquired property even though title
was held in his name alone. The wife had made valuable contribu-
tions of money and effort to the taxpayer's business. 80 The sub-
sequent transfer of property pursuant to a settlement agreement was
therefore argued to be a nontaxable division of co-owned property
and separate from transfer based on the husband's obligations of sup-
port and maintenance. 81 Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
characterization of the wife's interest in marital property as vesting at
the time of filing the divorce, the Tenth Circuit found the property
transfer to "merely .. . finalize the extent of the wife's vested inter-
est in property .. .held under 'a species of common ownership'." 82
After Collins II, the taxpayer appealed the Collins I decision to the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court remanded the decision to the Tenth Circuit in light of the Ok-
lahoma Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215
(1968) (per curiam) [Collins III]. The entire opinion reads:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated and the case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in [Collins II].
On remand, the Tenth Circuit in Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969)
[Collins IV], reversed its prior holding in Collins I.
76. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961). Oklahoma incorporated a marital property
concept in this statute the text of which provides:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by the
parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both
of said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties respectively
as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the property in kind, or by
setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the other thereof to pay
such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and just division thereof.
[emphasis added].
77. Id.
78. Id. Jointly acquired property has been defined in a Tax Court case as "a property right
created by divorce statutes in both spouses to property or the enhancement in the value of
property brought about by the joint industry of the husband and wife during their marriage."
Wiles v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 56, 65 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (1977). Oklahoma uses the term jointly acquired prop-
erty. Illinois uses the term marital property.
80. Collins II, 446 P.2d at 292-93. The wife, in fact, contributed $10,000 toward the marital
property plus playing an active role in the business itself.
81. Collins I, 388 F.2d at 355. The court agreed that all of the Oklahoma cases presented by
the taxpayer as precedent indicate "that the division is of jointly owned property and is to be
considered separate from the husband's obligations of alimony and support and maintenance."
Id. at 355.
82. Collins IV, 412 F.2d at 212.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed this position even though Oklahoma law
did not give the wife the traditional elements of co-ownership in the
marital property such as descendible interest, right to control and
manage, and a right to disposition. 83 The court expressly rejected
the interpretation that Davis created a conclusive federal criterion for
determining co-ownership, 84 indicating that the decision had "merely
discussed certain general characteristics of co-ownership in an attempt
to determine whether the wife possessed the rights of a co-owner
under state law." 85
In light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's characterization of the
wife's interest as similar to community property8 6 the court found
no need to search state law for ...other factors that might signify
the nature of the wife's property interest." 87  The wife was found to
have a vested interest in that property, unaffected by fault 88 and
exercisable by the wife upon dissolution of the marriage. 89  Therefore
the transaction was considered a nontaxable division of property be-
tween co-owners. 90
The method of analysis in Collins IV subsequently was affirmed by
the Tenth Circuit 91 under similar circumstances in Imel v. United
83. Collins I, 388 F.2d 357-58.
84. "[N]either the actual investiture of title, a right to make present disposition of property,
nor absence of a descendible interest" were held to be controlling. Collins II, 446 P. 2d at 297.
Moreover the court in Collins II further distinguished the Federal court's interpretation of
Oklahoma law on the ground that Oklahoma placed a mandatory duty upon the trial court to
divide the jointly acquired property. Id. at 295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1527(a) (1975)
provides the spouse a reasonable share in the other spouse's property only upon a separate suit.
Whereas OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961) mandates that the court must make a just
and reasonable division in all divorce proceedings.
85. Collins IV, 412 F.2d at 212. The Commissioner, however, contended that the Davis
factors are established federal criteria that must be met before the rights conferred by state law
can be said to constitute co-ownership.
86. Collins II, 446 P.2d at 295.
87. Collins IV, 412 F.2d at 212.
88. Collins II, 446 P.2d at 295, citing Davis v. Davis, 61 Okla. 275, 278, 161 P. 190, 193
(1916).
89. This characterization is almost identical to the Illinois Supreme Court's description of
marital property as becoming "subject to distribution upon termination of the marriage."
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill.2d 563, 575, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (1978).
90. Collins IV, 412 F.2d at 212.
91. However, in Wiles v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974), the court, interpreting
the Kansas division of property statute, found no "species of common ownership," even though
the Oklahoma statute in Collins was practically identical to the Kansas law. Id. at 258, 259.
Since there was no Kansas decision specifically defining the nature and extent of ownership, the
court, like the Davis court, used its own analysis of the rights awarded the transferee spouse. In
Kansas the wife had a right to intestate succession only if she survived her husband. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-504 (1964), and was entitled to one-half of all her deceased husband's realty
only if the husband sold the property without her consent. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-505 (1964).
The court found these rights "to possess some elements of a property interest," but were no
1978] APPRECIATED PROPERTY TRANSFERS
States.92  Under Colorado law, 93 the wife's rights included the right
to a "fair and equitable share" upon divorce of all "marital property,"
the share being determined in the court's discretion using such fac-
tors as contribution to the accumulation of the estate and, in contrast
to Oklahoma law, the financial needs and the financial conditions of
both parties. Nevertheless, the Imel court found the presence of two
factors evidencing a species of common ownership which operated to
make the marital distribution a nontaxable event according to Col-
orado law.
First, a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court was rendered de-
scribing the nature of the wife's rights. Pursuant to a Colorado pro-
more than "inchoate rights contingent upon the wife's survival." 499 F.2d at 257. Moreover, the
wife's right to receive a just and reasonable share of all property owned by the spouses, whether
owned jointly or separately, was considered inconsistent with the idea of co-owned property
because her share was determined at the discretion of the court. In Kansas, the trial court
divides the property considering these factors: the source of the property, the contribution of
each party, earning capacity, fault, needs, age and length of marriage. Id. at 257, 258. The
court concluded that "if the wife were a co-owner in Kansas, her interest in the property to be
divided would be based on more than a right to a 'just and equitable' share therein." Id. at 258.
The statute involved, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(c) (1976), provided for the division of prop-
erty in this manner:
The decree shall divide the real and personal property of the parties, whether
owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her
own right after marriage, or acquired by the joint efforts, in a just and reasonable
manner, either by a division of the property in kind, or by setting the same or a
part thereof over to one of the spouses and requiring either to pay such sum as may
be just and proper, or by ordering a sale of the same under such conditions as the
court may prescribe and dividing the proceeds of such sale. [emphasis added].
92. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
93. The statute in effect at the time of the divorce proceedings was COLO. REV. STAT. §
46-1-5 (1963). It provided that "the court may make such orders, if any, as the circumstances of
the case may warrant relative to a division of property, in such proportions as may be fair and
equitable." Colorado adopted the concept of marital property or "joint accumulations" by judi-
cial decision. See, e.g., Kalcevic v. Kalcevic, 156 Colo. 151, 397 P.2d 483 (1964). The state
codified the concept in CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973), a statute almost identical to
Illinois' new law. The Colorado disposition of property section provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation or a proceeding
for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court which lacked
personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the
property, the court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the
marital property, without regard to marital misconduct, in such proportions as the
court deems just after considering all relevant factors including: (a) The contribu-
tion of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the con-
tribution of a spouse as homemaker; (b) The value of the property set apart to each
spouse; (c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having cus-
tody of any children; and (d) Any increases or decreases in the value of the separate
property of the spouse during the marriage or the depletion of the separate prop-
erty for marital purposes. [emphasis added]. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973).
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cedural rule, 94 the Imel court had the question of the wife's rights
certified by the Colorado Supreme Court. 95 The Colorado court held
that the wife's rights in any jointly accumulated "marital property" to
be entirely separate from the husband's personal obligations of
alimony or support. 96 During the marriage the husband's property
remained free from any vested interest of the wife, and he remained
free to dispose of the property as he chose. 97 The actual vesting of
property rights in the wife was limited to the "situation in which a
divorce action has been filed, the court has jurisdiction over the par-
ties and the subject matter, and the case proceeds to both a decree of
divorce and a division of property." 98 Prior to the dissolution action,
those rights were found by the state supreme court to be completely
inchoate, 99 but only in the sense that prior to the division the prop-
erty to be transferred to the wife has not yet been determined. 100
Upon filing of the action the court may protect this Vested interest
pending the division order. 1° 1
Second, the certification was specifically limited to property trans-
fers made in recognition of the wife's contribution to the accumula-
tion of the marital estate. 10 2  During the marriage, the wife had
made substantial contributions to the accumulation of property and
the parties explicitly agreed that the family estate resulted from those
94. COLO. S. CT. App. R. 21.1.
95. In Re Questions Submitted By United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). The
questions posed by the District Court for the Colorado Supreme Court were: "When under
1963 C.R.S. 46-1-5 [or under 1963 C.R.S. 46-1-13 as amended in 1971].• ." is the transfer a
taxable event for purposes of federal income taxation? The court listed these particular cir-
cumstances:
(a) a property settlement agreement is entered into providing for a transfer of prop-
erty from husband to wife in acknowledgment of the wife's contribution to the ac-
cumulation of the marital estate, or, (b) a decree of the divorce court requires such
transfer because of the wife's contributions to the accumulation of the family estate,
and, (c) the transfer is not made in satisfaction of the husband's obligation for sup-
port.
Id. The court phrased the question in this manner:
Under Colorado law is such a transfer a recognition of a 'species of common owner-
ship' of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between
co-owners, or does the transfer more closely resemble a conveyance by the husband
for a release of an independent obligation owed by him to the wife?
Id. at 1332.
96. Id. at 1335-36.
97. Id. at 1334-35.
98. Id. at 1335.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1333.
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joint efforts. 10 3 As in Collins IV, the Tenth Circuit, refusing to
examine state law beyond the certification and contribution issues, 104
held that the Colorado Supreme Court had conclusively defined the
rights and interests of the. parties in the marital property under Col-
orado property law. 10 5
MARITAL PROPERTY IN ILLINOIS:
A SPECIES OF COMMON OWNERSHIP?
To determine if marital property in Illinois can be considered a
species of common ownership, a comparison need only be made of
the similarity of the Illinois Act with the property law of the tradi-
tional community property states, the common law states adopting
statutes similar to community property statutes 106 and the precedent
construing such law. 10 7 The Illinois Act, although not a community
103. 523 F.2d at 857. This may be the most significant legacy of Imel. The court stated that
"[u]nder the findings of both the state and federal courts the wife materially aided the accumu-
lation of the family wealth and the settlement agreement was a fair division of the property." Id.
The district court also observed that "under Colorado law an equitable award of money or
property to the wife is dependent upon [the] extent of her contribution .... 375 F. Supp.
1102, 1105 (D. Colo. 1973). Certain commentators have termed this principle the "contribution
concept." See Comment, New Approach to the Transfer of Appreciated Property Pursuant to
Divorce, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 616 (1976). Other commentators have termed such a principle
the "marital partnership approach." The foundation of such a principle is the assumption that
marriage is a conjugal partnership the success of which depends upon the efforts of both
spouses. See Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Property Settlements in
Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Proposal, 29 MAINE
L. REV. 73 (1977).
104. However, the Tenth Circuit did criticize the district court's phrasing of the certification
questions. The court observed that the federal district court should not have forced the state
court to decide whether the transaction was a taxable event because such a determination was
beyond the scope of state authority. Rather, it should have framed the question so as to only
require a determination of state law. 523 F.2d at 857.
105. 523 F.2d at 857.
106. The other jurisdictions which have adopted similar Dissolution of Marriage Acts are:
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-101 to 10-133, effective 1972; Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT.
§§ 403.010-.350, effective 1972; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 661-752, effective 1972;
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.075-.415 (Vernon's), effective 1973; and Montana, MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48-301 to 341, effective 1976.
107. When Illinois adopts a statute which has been adopted by other jurisdictions it is pre-
sumed that Illinois adopts the statutory constructions of those statutes as well. Overview, supra
note 9, at 1-2, citing Ballance v. Rankin, 12 I11. 420 (1851). See also Illinois Power Co. v. Miller,
11 I11. App.2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 78 (3d Dist. 1956) (Illinois adopted the construction given by
the courts of other states to their declaratory judgment statutes including the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act; Illinois' declaratory judgment act was adopted from the -statute of those
states); Cook v. Dove, 32 Il.2d 109, 203 N.E.2d 892 (1965) (Illinois adopted the statutory
constructions of the New York statutory inheritance tax provisions from New York in support of
the Illinois statute which was patterned after the New York statute). All the above were cited in
Overview, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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property statute, has in effect adopted the principles and rationale
underlying community property. This fact is evidenced by several
points.
First, Illinois has incorporated the rationale of community property
by creating a separate class of property, a separate res,108 for divorce
purposes consisting of all property acquired by the efforts of either
spouse during marriage. 10 9 If a common law state provides this new
res, as does Illinois, it can be argued that the wife is granted a prop-
erty interest upon divorce similar to the property interest granted a
wife under community property laws. 110
Second, marital property and community property both incorporate
the partnership theory of marriage "I which assumes the marriage to
be a conjugal partnership the success of which depends upon the ef-
forts of both husband and wife. 112 Both parties contribute to the
marital community's prosperity"I 3 and are entitled to rights in any
108. "Marital property" is a species of common ownership created by divorce law. Ownership
interests, normally created by property law, can also be created by divorce statutes. See Richard
E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56, 65 (1973) (Goffe, J., dissenting). See also De Funiak, A Review in
Brief of Principles of Community Property, 32 Ky. L.J. 63 (1943).
109. 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 624.4 (Rev. ed. 1977). As
in Illinois, the res in Colorado is termed "marital property." COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113
(1973); in Oklahoma it's termed "jointly acquired property." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278
(West 1977). In the community property jurisdictions it is obviously called "community prop-
erty."
110. This would meet the Revenue Ruling's test of co-ownership for tax purposes. Rev. Rul.
74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. The Ruling provides that "property may be co-owned where (1) title to
it is taken jointly under State property law, (2) the State is a community property law State, or
(3) State property law is found to be similar to community property law." Inclusion of (3) indi-
cates that the Service recognizes that certain states have created a property interest in marital
property similar to what exists in community property states. Id. at 27.
111. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill.2d 563, 576, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (1978). The court
considered the primary legislative objective to be the creation of "a system of property division
upon dissolution . . . that is more equitable than which previously existed in this state." Id. The
court continued:
[Bly giving both spouses an interest in "marital property" upon dissolution of mar-
riage, the legislature sought to award economic credit in the distribution of property
for indirect or domestic contributions to the accumulation of property and sought to
replace the concept of post-marital support through alimony with one of post-marital
stability through a just distribution of marital property and assets.
Id.
112. 4A R. POVELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 109, at 624.4. See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT (ULA), Vol. 9 (Master ed. 1973), prefatory note at 457.
113. "[W]ith respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a community of which
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and
possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after its dissolution." W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 at 2-3.
"[T]he policy of community property was to establish equality between husband
and wife in the area of property rights in marital property acquisition, in recognition
of and to give effect to the fundamental equality between the spouses based on the
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marital property upon dissolution of that marriage. Illinois, as well as
Oklahoma and Colorado, recognizes the wife's "partnership interest"
in the marital assets by providing that the court can base the spouse's
share of marital property on his or her respective contributions. 114
And under both community property and marital property systems
the wife's contributions can be in the form of actual economic con-
tributions outside the home or solely based on services performed as
a housewife. 115
The third indication that the Illinois Act has adopted the commun-
ity property philosophy in its distribution provision is that the trans-
feree spouse shares in the marital property as the divorce court
deems "just and reasonable." Illinois shares this requirement with
Oklahoma and Colorado as well as with a majority of the community
property states. Although limiting the wife's share upon divorce to a
discretionary "just and reasonable" portion was considered a factor
indicating lack of co-ownership in Davis, the specific rights of co-
ownership recognized in community property jurisdictions indicate
otherwise. Six of the eight community property states provide that
the community property should be divided as is just and right 116 or
just and equitable. 117  Only in California and Louisiana is the strict
rule of equality of division followed. 118
separate identity of each spouse and the actual contribution that each made to the
success of the marriage."
Id. § 11.1 at 24. [emphasis added].
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (1977).
115. The Illinois Act also allows "contribution of the spouse as a homemaker or to the family
unit." Id. See also 4A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 109 at 624.4. Other jurisdictions
recognizing contribution of the spouse as a homemaker in property distribution include Col-
orado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri and Montana.
116. Asuz. REV. STAT. § 25-318 (1975). Section 25-318 was amended in 1977 and provides
that the court "shall divide property held in common equitably-though not necessarily in
kind, without regard to marital misconduct." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon
1975).
117. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1976);
Idaho allows for a "just" division. IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Supp. 1977). New Mexico allows an
unequal division based on other discretionary factors. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp. 1975).
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. Art. 2406
(West 1971). The author of the Act distinguishes Illinois' new marital property system from
community property in that the marital property system "does not mandate an equal division of
marital property (although in many cases it may be appropriate to do so) .. " Moreover, the
equitable apportionment of property system affords the court a greater latitude in
awarding property than that conferred upon the court under the rigid rules obtain-
ing in a community property system where an equal division of property is man-
dated regardless of the equities in a given case. The court in an equitable distribu-
tion system is invested with the broad discretion necessary to achieve just and
equitable results in all cases.
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The foregoing analysis of these similarities reveals that the income
tax treatment of transfers in the marital property jurisdiction of Il-
linois should be governed by the same rationale as is used in the
taxation of community property transfers. In community property
states, all transfers of appreciated property made to effectuate an
equal division of the fair market value are considered a division of
co-owned property and deemed nontaxable. 119 If the transfer in-
volves an unequal division of the community property,120 gain to the
transferor will result l2 ' as an unequal division is presumed to be a
transfer in satisfaction of a personal marital obligation. This analysis
applies to those community property jurisdictions which allow the
trial court discretion in the distribution of the property. 122 Those
community property states which mandate a one-half distribution
would therefore have a nontaxable distribution. 123 An equal division
of property in Illinois should therefore be considered nontaxable as
well.
The Internal Revenue Service has applied a similar analysis to the
unequal division of jointly held property pursuant to a dissolution ac-
tion in noncommunity property states.' 2 4 The Service has deter-
mined that an unequal division of appreciated property constitutes
realization of taxable gain.125 The total appreciation will be allocated
pro rata between the property transferred in recognition of contribu-
tion and the property transferred in recognition of a personal obliga-
tion. 126 In effect, the transferor in a common law jurisdiction should
be taxed on any appreciation allocated to that portion of property
transferred for alimony or support purposes. 127
Auerbach, Property Rights and Maintenance Under the Illinois and Dissolution of Marriage
Act, in NEw DIVORCE LAw 5-2 (I11. Inst. for CLE, 1978). However, this so-called "discretion-
ary latitude" is not a function peculiar to "marital property systems" alone.
119. Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213.
120. The nontaxable nature of the division of jointly held property has been implicitly
adopted in community property states if there is an equal division of the "community." Osceola
H. Davenport, 12 T.C.M. 856, 53,259 P-H Memo T.C. (1953).
121. Gain is recognized where the community division is unequal. C.C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908
(1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
122. See notes 116 and 117 supra.
123. See note 118 supra.
124. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. See note 127 infra. The example given is basically the
same used in the Revenue Ruling.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For example, assume an Illinois couple has marital property with a fair market value of
$70,000. The dissolution decree awards the wife $55,000 of the marital property and the hus-
band $15,000 plus all of his separately owned property. This unequal division of jointly owned
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Therefore, any division of property in Illinois specifically made in
recognition of the spouse's contribution,' 2 8 as was true in Imel and
Collins IV, should properly be considered nontaxable regardless of
whether the division is equal or not. 129  However, if an Illinois trial
court specifically bases the wife's share of marital property upon such
factors as need or earning capacity, the transfer could be considered
an exchange in satisfaction of a personal obligation and therefore tax-
able under Davis.130
CONCLUSION
United States v. Davis held that where in a common law state a
wife's marital rights in the husband's property are limited to rights of
dower, intestate share and a reasonable share upon divorce, a transfer
of appreciated property by the husband to the wife at divorce is taxa-
ble to the husband. The Court held these rights to closely resemble
the wife's common law rights of alimony and support. As such the
transfer was considered a taxable exchange for the release of a per-
sonal obligation rather than a nontaxable division of co-owned
property.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has interpreted the Davis
indicia of ownership as a federal criterion of marital rights that the
wife must possess in the husband's property to be considered a co-
property would be considered a taxable exchange as to only a portion of the husband's marital
obligations, that is, that portion reflecting the wife's share presumed to be one-half of the total
value of the property, or $35,000. Therefore the amount transferred by the husband considered
to be in exchange for his marital obligations would be $20,000 (wife's award of $55,000 less
wife's statutorily defined share of $35,000). The husband will be taxed on any appreciation
proportionally allocated to the $20,000.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1)-(10); See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113
(1)(a)-(d) (1973).
129. 523 F.2d at 857. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
130. It must be remembered that the certification questions submitted to the Colorado Su-
preme Court in In re Questions Submitted By the United States Dist. Ct., 184 Colo. 1, 517
P.2d 1331 (1974), involved only transfers in recognition of a wife's contributions. The certifica-
tion granted "a species of common ownership" only to those transfers made in recognition of
such a contribution. See note 95 supra.
In Collins II, the Oklahoma Supreme Court based its opinion, in part, on the fact that the
wife had made valuable contributions toward the success and growth of the taxpayer's business.
446 P.2d at 292. In Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
836 (1964), the court held a property transfer to be taxable because the wife "performed the
usual duties of a housewife, and performed no other tasks to specifically assist in the accumula-
tion of property, and brought no property into the marriage." 329 F.2d at 98. See also Wallace
v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 761, (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971); Ernest H. Mills, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th
Cir. 1971).
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owner for federal income tax purposes. As in traditional common law
states, an Illinois wife under the Act cannot manage, control or dis-
pose of property held in her husband's name, nor does she have a
descendible interest in his property. Under the Commissioner's
interpretation of Davis these rights would not reach the dignity of
co-ownership. However, an analysis of Davis indicates that the indicia
of ownership are not the exclusive standard for determining co-own-
ership. Neither the right to manage, control or dispose nor the right
to more than a reasonable share were characteristic of co-ownership
in community property jurisdictions at the time Davis was decided.
The courts are free to rely on other factors in determining co-owner-
ship.
An alternative analysis was provided by the Tenth Circuit in the
Collins IV and Imel decisions. The court gave great emphasis to the
state law characterization of the wife's marital rights. In both cases
the state supreme court defined the wife's rights as a "species of
common ownership." And in both instances the transfer was made in
recognition of the wife's contributions to the marital community.
Under such analysis the transfers were held to be nontaxable. It
should be noted that Section 503 of the Illinois Act is substantially
identical to the statute in question in Colorado. As in Colorado, as
well as the community property jurisdictions, Illinois has recognized
the concept of a marital partnership by creating a class of marital
property, and by granting the trial court the discretion to divide this
property between the parties on the basis of their respective con-
tributions. Therefore, any transfer of appreciated property made to
effect a division of marital assets in recognition of contribution should
not be taxable in Illinois. However, a transfer in recognition of the
wife's needs or financial condition made to satisfy the functions of
alimony should be considered taxable.
Anthony J. Ceravolo
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